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Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future 
remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the 
Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on 
the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these 
‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly re-
jected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine 
remains in a condition of smouldering war.
In this situation of uncertainty, the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ are continuing 
to make efforts to legitimize and strengthen their ‘statehood’, most notably by means of 
a new historical policy. Both para-states are trying to revise the assessments of historical events 
which have been established during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Serious efforts are 
being made in the area of the ‘patriotic education’ of children, both in school and during extra- 
-curricular activities; there are new ‘state’ holidays, cults, and a large-scale campaign honour-
ing and perpetuating the memories of the new ‘rebel’ heroes and of civilians who have died at 
the hands of the Kyiv ’murderers’ is being conducted. 
Moreover the events of the war of 1941–5 are being reinterpreted, compared to the current 
military actions ‘against the fascists’. The new ‘state’ cult is being built on just such a paral-
lel, which not only imparts significance to the current events, but also helps to contrast the 
‘republics’ to today’s Ukraine. The intended effect of the DPR and LPR’s historical policies is 
the creation of a new Donbas community which is hostile towards ‘nationalist’ Ukraine.
A short history of ‘the donetskiye’
In their centralized propaganda, the ‘republics’ 
are trying to partly change the local identi-
ty which developed over the years of Ukraini-
an independence on the remains of the Soviet 
self-perception, as well as on new economic, 
political and cultural realities. The local oligarch 
Rinat Akhmetov and the administrative elite de-
pendent on him predominated in this period. 
Most of these people left the region in 2014, 
and have therefore been declared traitors to 
the Donbas.
In the Soviet period, more or less until the eco-
nomic stagnation of Brezhnev’s rule, the Don-
bas was considered as especially important 
industrial region, which was reflected in the 
identity of the local people. In this period the 
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importance of the region began to fall, and 
during the 1980s the tendencies towards crises 
and the threat of losing its privileged status led 
to mass strikes by the miners.
One of the reasons for the local population’s 
support of Ukrainian independence was their 
aspiration to keep the Donbas dominant in the 
economy, and thus in the politics of the country 
as a whole. However, along with independence 
Ukraine fell into a deep economic crisis, which 
hit hardest at the outdated industry and at the 
workers themselves, who had become accus-
tomed to high salaries and privileges.
In addition, a new national ideology began to 
dominate in Ukraine, wherein the ‘proletarian’ 
Donbas, Russian-speaking and rooted in Soviet 
culture, could have only a marginal position. 
This is why, although the miners’ demands dur-
ing the spring 1991 strikes included state sover-
eignty for Ukraine, demands for ‘federalization’ 
and the granting of official status for the Rus-
sian language appeared during the 1993 strike. 
The local elites tried to take advantage of the 
situation as they tried to get some economic 
concessions from Kyiv. The showdown came 
to a head when the Donetsk region refused to 
transfer its share of contributions to the cen-
tral budget, calling it a ‘part of Kyiv’s debt’ to 
the region. As a concession to the protestors 
– and continuing their blackmail of Kyiv – in 
1994 the leaders of the region agreed, simul-
taneously with the parliamentary elections, to 
hold a ‘consultative referendum’ on the feder-
alization of Ukraine and the status of the Rus-
sian language. The vast majority of residents 
of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions supported 
the federal structure and the use of Russian as 
a second state language.
At the same time, the redistribution of former 
state assets started in the country, accompa-
nied by clashes between the mafia clans, which 
had begun in the late 1980s. One of the larg-
est clans was created in the Donetsk region. 
It began to fight not only for industrial assets, 
but also for political power, initially within the 
region and then throughout the country. Only 
influence in Kyiv could guarantee the security 
of their business, which the laws formally in 
force at that time did not ensure. As the result 
of this battle, the Donetsk clan obtained com-
plete control over the region. Not trusting Kyiv 
and struggling to find a place in the new coun-
try, the population of Donbas fell in behind the 
local leaders, who started to be referred to as 
‘donetskiye’ throughout Ukraine, a term with 
a very negative meaning. 
Donbas became increasingly isolated from the 
rest of the country politically, economically, 
and culturally. Although teaching in schools 
was coordinated by the center – in this re-
spect, Donetsk differed little from Lviv – except 
for domination of Russian language at local 
schools, the media’s propaganda fell on fertile 
soil and proved more effective. This is well illus-
trated by results of the research conducted by 
sociologists from Lviv and the Donbas in 2004; 
most of these areas residents gained their 
knowledge of Ukraine’s history from media, 
primarily from television (74%), whereas only 
a third of residents in both areas learned from 
school programs.
Surveys conducted in 1994, 1999 and 2004 
demonstrated also that whereas among the 
residents of Lviv ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘person from 
Lviv (львів’янин)’ were the most popular iden-
tities, in Donetsk a regional identity prevailed: 
over 55% in 1994 and over 68% in 2004 re-
ferred to themselves first of all as ’person form 
Donetsk (дончане)’. In 1994 40% of those sur-
veyed referred to themselves as ‘a Soviet person 
(советский человек)’, whereas even in 2004, 
A new national ideology began to domi-
nate in Ukraine, wherein the ‘proletarian’ 
Donbas, Russian-speaking and rooted 
in Soviet culture, could have only a mar-
ginal position.
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declarations of Ukrainian identity in Donetsk 
barely exceeded 40 percent1.
By 2004, when regular presidential elections 
were scheduled, Donbas already had the im-
age in Ukraine of the ‘criminal capital’ and 
a region of ‘Soviet people’ or pro-Russian 
Ukrainophobes. A survey conducted in 2004 
among residents of Donbas and Galicia showed 
that Lugansk residents saw Galicia, and Lviv res-
idents saw the Donbas as ‘an aggressive region 
which tries to impose its rules on the whole 
country’. At the same time, both saw them-
selves as places ‘whose development should 
become a model for the whole of Ukraine’ and 
which ‘must defend its specificity and its right 
to live according to its own principles’2.
These regional differences made it easy to ap-
ply political technology, as was tested as early 
as 1999, when Leonid Kuchma won his second 
presidential term by winning enormous support 
in the west of Ukraine because his competitor 
was Petro Symonenko, a Communist who was 
popular in the east3. In the 2004 election, the 
major candidates campaign headquarters be-
gan to exploit the mutual fears of inhabitants 
of the west and east of the country, the lat-
ter’s political center being Donetsk, which at 
that time was the ‘capital’ of Russian-speaking 
Ukraine. While the conventionally-understood 
1 V. Sereda, Regional Historical Identities and Mem-
ory http://uamoderna.com/images/archiv/12_2/8_
UM_12_2_Statti_Sereda.pdf; Н. Черниш, О. Маланчук, 
Динаміка ідентичностей мешканців Львова 
і Донецька: компаративний аналіз (1994-2004 pp.), 
ht tp: / /uamo-derna.com/ images /archiv /12_ 2 /5_
UM_12_2_Statti_ Chernysh_Malanchuk.pdf
2 ht tp: / /uamoderna.com / images /arch i v /12_ 2 / 3_
UM_12_2_Forum.pdf
3 http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp1999/WEBPROC0
western Ukraine was being frightened by the 
notion that ‘bandits’ and ‘puppets of Moscow’ 
were striving for power in Kyiv, the Donbas con-
tinued to be alienated by stories of aggressive 
Ukrainian ‘fascists’ and their attempts to humili-
ate the region’s inhabitants of by replacing their 
heroes with strangers, and imposing a ‘wrong’ 
version of history and ‘rural’ Ukrainian language 
and culture4. These stereotypes played a major 
role in Donbas at the beginning of 2014, when 
the military operation Kyiv had to initiate aid-
ed Russian television by confirming its vision of 
‘aggressive Ukrainian nationalists’.
Old memorials – new heroes 
In this way, the ideological work of the self-pro-
claimed republics’ leaderships had already 
been made easier by their predecessors, and by 
Ukrainian politicians and intellectuals: by 2014 
the Donbas’s regional identity had to a great 
extent been grounded on the political strife 
with the rest of Ukraine. 
At the same time, matters were complicated 
because the center of this identity was based 
not only on Soviet myths and memory about 
the former Soviet glory, but also on an identifi-
cation with the regional political and econom-
ic elite, the ‘mafia’, the main embodiment of 
which was the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. After 
the de facto authorities of the Donetsk ‘repub-
lic’ finally stopped the work of his foundation 
for humanitarian assistance to the region’s in-
habitants and all his enterprises were ‘trans-
ferred to external management’, a campaign 
to discredit Akhmetov began in the self-pro-
claimed para-states. This was especially no-
ticeable in the Luhansk ‘republic’, where living 
4 A typical example of this kind of article is Features of 
early fascism: disturbing parallels between 1930s Ger-
many and Ukraine 2004, published several days be-
fore the ‘third round’ of the presidential elections; see 
А. Аненков, Особенности раннего фашизма, тре-
вожные параллели Германии 30-х и Украины-2004, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20050219085228/http://
zadonbass.org:80/first/message.html?id=8360
In 1994 40% of those surveyed referred to 
themselves as ‘a Soviet person’, where-
as even in 2004, Ukrainian identity in 
Donetsk barely exceeded 40 percent.
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standards had always been much lower than in 
the Donetsk region, and where the welfare of 
a considerable part of the locals depended com-
pletely on the Donetsk oligarch’s enterprises5. 
Today the authorities of the Donetsk and 
Luhansk ‘people’s republics’ are trying to in-
troduce new heroes in place of the ‘Donetsk 
mafia’. Donetsk has succeeded in this task to 
a much greater degree than Luhansk. This can 
be explained by the specifics of the relations be-
tween the self-appointed leaders and warlords 
in both ‘republics’. Almost all the active and 
relatively popular participants of the so-called 
‘Russian spring’ of 2014 have one way or an-
other gradually been excluded from public po-
sitions and participation in local politics. How-
ever, whereas in Donetsk they were either sent 
into exile to Russia or condemned to oblivion, 
being barred from appearance in almost totally 
‘state’-run media, in Luhansk such people, in-
cluding the influential warlord Aleksei Mozgov-
oy and the ‘prime minister’ Gennady Tsypkalov, 
have been assassinated.
Two notorious murders of locally respected mili-
tia commanders, Arsen Pavlov a.k.a. ‘Motorola’ 
and Mikhail Tolstych a.k.a. ‘Givi’, also took place 
in Donetsk. As in the case of Mozgovoy, the 
deaths of Pavlov and Tolstykh were present-
ed to the public as having been carried out by 
‘Ukrainian saboteurs’. But, in contrast to the de 
facto head of the Luhansk ‘republic’ of that time, 
Igor Plotnitsky, the Donetsk leader Aleksandr 
Zakharchenko incorporated Pavlov and Tolstykh 
into the ‘republican’ pantheon which is current-
ly being created, commemorating their armed 
feats, issuing stamps and creating museum ex-
hibits devoted to them. In 2017, as part of the 
annual ‘Immortal Regiment’ event held on the 
Victory Day of 9 May, when participants march-
ing in columns carry portraits of their grand-
5 At the beginning of 2017, following the blockade of 
Ukraine’s ‘republics’, Akhmetov’s enterprises on territo-
ries not controlled by Kyiv were de facto nationalized. 
At the same time, the local media criticized Akhmetov, 
accusing him of “betrayal” and “robbing” Donbass, as 
well as of supporting Kyiv’s “anti-terrorist operation”. 
See http://lug-info.com/search/r/q/ахметов?page= 1
fathers and great-grandfathers who fought in 
World War II, Zakharchenko participated while 
carrying a photograph of Arsen Pavlov.
Since 2014, the main platform upon which the 
historical policy of the self-proclaimed elite of 
Donetsk and Luhansk ‘republics’ has been cre-
ated is ‘the ‘Great Patriotic War’ – the current 
armed conflict. The confrontation with official 
Kyiv (where political power, as has been de-
clared, has been seized by ‘fascists’ with back-
ing from the West), is broadly compared to the 
war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. 
For example, both in 1943 and in 2014 the heav-
iest fighting in Donbas took place in the area 
of Savur-Mohyla, a strategic hill near the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian border, which is currently out-
side Kyiv’s control. The WWII monument on 
Savur-Mohyla, which was built in the Soviet pe-
riod, was severely damaged in combat in 2014. 
The construction of a new monument and the 
organisation of commemorative events in its ter-
ritory became part of the historical policy of the 
self-proclaimed Donetsk republic’s authorities.
The self-proclaimed Luhansk republic, in turn, 
has begun to build up ‘state’ cults around 
places and dates related to the Young Guard, 
the underground youth organization of the 
World War II period, whose existence is histor-
ically disputable but was raised to the level of 
a myth during the Soviet period. For example, 
in March 2018 three schools in the Luhansk 
‘republic’ were named after members of the 
Young Guard.
In Donetsk and Luhansk attempts have also 
begun to use the pre-Soviet and early Soviet 
The ideological work of the self-pro-
claimed republics’ leaderships had already 
been made easier: by 2014 the Donbas re-
gional identity had to a great extent been 
grounded on the political strife with the 
rest of Ukraine.
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history of these territories for historical legiti-
mation. In 2018, when Ukraine is commemorat-
ing the centenary of its independence, Donetsk 
proclaimed the ‘year of history’. In February 
2018 a cycle of ceremonies took place in the 
DPR dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the 
proclamation by local Bolshevik leaders of 
the ‘Donetsk-Krivoy Rog republic’ – which 
never really existed. 
New ‘state’ holidays are also appearing. For 
example, at the end of February the Luhansk 
and Donetsk ‘republics’ widely celebrated the 
third anniversary of the end of the ‘Debaltsevo- 
-Chernukhino operation’, when the Ukraini-
an Armed forces were routed in the so-called 
‘Debaltseve cauldron’6. These holidays were not 
only an expression of the historical policy of the 
‘republics’ leaderships, but also demonstrated 
the improvement in relations between them 
after the change of nominal government in Lu-
hansk, in connection with the escape to Rus-
sia of the latter ‘republic’s’ former leader Igor 
Plotnitsky, who had had serious disputes with 
Aleksandr Zakharchenko.
The holidays celebrated in the self-proclaimed 
republics set these territories against Ukraine, 
whether this entails the newly-created com-
memorations related to the war against Kyiv 
and the ‘foundation of statehood’, or the old 
Soviet celebrations such as Victory Day or De-
fenders of the Fatherland Day, which the Ukrain-
6 Since Plotnitsky’s overthrow, a rapprochement between 
the ‘republics’ has begun. This was most noticeably 
on display in the joint celebration of the victory in the 
‘Debaltsevo-Chernuchino operation’, which according 
to the ‘official’ version was a joint military action by the 
two ‘republics’, though actually the key part in it was 
played by regular Russian forces.
ian state is breaking away from by conducting 
a comprehensive process of ‘de-Communization’. 
Educating the new ‘citizens’
During four years of war, a generation which 
does not remember life before 2014 and has no 
personal experience of life in Ukraine has be-
gun to grow in the self-proclaimed republics in 
the Donbas. In 2015 new school programmes 
and textbooks began to appear in Luhansk and 
Donetsk, which the de facto authorities of the 
territories in the east of Ukraine outside Kyiv’s 
control intend to use in order to raise the new 
generation as exemplary ‘citizens’. In 2015 so-
called ‘lessons of civic consciousness’ were in-
troduced in the Donetsk ‘republic’, starting from 
kindergarten. During these lessons, children are 
supposed to be taught within three modules: 
‘The Donbas is my native land’, ‘Develop your-
self as a citizen of the Donetsk people’s republic’ 
and ‘The Donbas and the Russian world’. The 
same lessons continue at school, from the first 
to the eleventh grade. Apart from these, the 
‘History of the Fatherland’, which has replaced 
the history of Ukraine, has been introduced 
into the school curriculum. Within this course 
children should study two subjects, the ‘His-
tory of Russia’ and the ‘History of the Donetsk 
Region’, with the latter taking priority. In these 
subjects, the history of Ukraine is introduced 
only in the context of the history of Kievan Rus 
(which is called Ancient Rus in ‘republican’ text-
books7), the Russian Empire and the history of 
the USSR. Only the penultimate chapter of the 
History of the Donetsk Region for high school 
seniors, covering the period 1991–2013, refers 
to the Donbas as a part of Ukraine. This means 
that the Donbas is treated almost exclusively as 
a part of the Russian state.
However, the existing local textbooks and 
school curriculums contain many contradictions. 
7 The name Kievan Rus, which was first used during the 
period of the Russian Empire, was replaced in Russia af-
ter 2014 by the name Ancient Rus or the Old Russian 
State.
The confrontation with official Kyiv, where 
political power, as has been declared, has 
been seized by ‘fascists’ with backing from 
the West, is broadly compared to the war 
of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany.
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Most importantly, there is no complete pic-
ture of whether today’s Luhansk and Donetsk 
‘republics’ are states or, if not, what their ad-
ministrative and territorial status really is. 
So, in the Donetsk ‘republic’s’ schools, the re-
gion is studied as part of courses concerning 
geographical matters, and in the curriculums 
and textbooks of these courses the Donbas 
is merely called an ‘area’ (край). At the same 
time, however, the textbooks are equipped 
with all the ‘state’ symbols of the self-pro-
claimed republic, and the date of its declara-
tion is included on the list of ‘public holidays’. 
The most controversial of all these subjects, per-
haps, is economic geography for the 9th grade. 
Because all economic indicators in Donetsk are 
classified, the latest data in the textbook comes 
from 2013, and discusses the Donetsk region 
as a part of Ukraine, even though the textbook 
was published in 2016. The recommended to 
schools workbook for a practical exercises on 
‘economic and social geography of the native 
land’ is based on the same data.
Luhansk has effectively avoided any contradic-
tions of this kind by not including ‘area studies’ 
into the school curriculum and by using mostly 
Russian textbooks. The ‘History of the Father-
land’ is understood there as ‘part of world his-
tory’ and is interpreted as the history of the ter-
ritory of Donbas, and specifically the Luhansk 
region. Textbooks on Russian history are only 
‘additional literature’ for this course, as is em-
phasized in the curriculum. In practice, both the 
history of Russia and the history of Ukraine are 
studied within this course. The course of ‘Histo-
ry of the Fatherland’ in the Donetsk ‘republic’ 
contains no Ukrainian sources in its list of rec-
ommended literature. However, in Luhansk the 
course also includes books and articles, pub-
lished in Ukraine (in Ukrainian as well), includ-
ing a translation of Freedom and Terror in the 
Donbas, a well-known work by the American 
researcher Hiroaki Kuromiya. 
Where Donetsk has ‘lessons of civic conscious-
ness’, Luhansk offers extracurricular activities 
entitled ‘Program of spiritual and moral edu-
cation for schoolchildren and students of the 
Luhansk people’s republic’, which lays emphasis 
on the holidays and traditions of the Orthodox 
church. In elementary school grades, children 
are also taught ‘the Basics of Orthodox culture’.
Because local textbooks for the majority of 
school subjects in the ‘republics’ have not 
yet been published, the quality and content 
of teaching in each specific subject depends to 
a great degree on the teacher and the school 
administrations.
The ‘Donbas people’
In the course of the war years, a peculiar system 
of concepts related to the conflict has begun 
to develop in the breakaway territories of the 
Ukrainian east. Soldiers of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine are often called ‘occupiers’, the govern-
ment-held part of Donbas is ‘territories tempo-
rarily under Ukrainian control’, its inhabitants are 
‘compatriots’, and the declared future accession 
of this territory to the ‘republics’ is ‘reunification’.
Besides, there is the expression ‘the Donbas 
people’, which took root in local usage when 
the so-called ‘Humanitarian program for the re-
unification of the Donbas people’ was launched 
in both the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘republics’. 
The stated goal of this program is to provide 
help to the residents of those parts of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions under Ukrainian 
governmental control, who are allegedly suffer-
ing under Kyiv’s rule, from payments to veter-
ans of the Great Patriotic War, to medical care 
and education at the local universities.
In 2015 new school programmes and text-
books began to appear in Luhansk and 
Donetsk, by means of which the de fac-
to authorities of the territories in the east 
of Ukraine outside Kyiv’s control intend 
to bring up this generation as exemplary 
‘citizens’.
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For now, it is still difficult to define with full 
confidence what specifically the expression ‘the 
Donbas people’ is understood to mean. Does it 
mean the population of the region, or are the 
heads of these self-proclaimed states thinking 
of the existence of a separate Donbas nation? 
It is unclear, for example, what in their minds 
distinguishes the Donbas’s residents from ‘Rus-
sians’ in other Ukrainian regions, which the 
ideologists of the ‘Russian spring’ included into 
the so-called Novorossiya in 2014. On the one 
hand, even during the signing of the Minsk 
agreements, the ‘republican’ authorities insist-
ed on expanding their control onto the whole 
territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. 
On the other hand, the fact of the existence 
of two Donbas ‘republics’ makes the claims of 
their nominal administrations to ‘reunify’ the 
‘Donbas people’ in the pre-war borders of the 
two regions seem foolish. Moreover, while in 
the education system of Luhansk ‘Homeland’ 
refers specifically to Lugansk, in Donetsk the 
same term refers to Russia, while education 
about Donetsk forms part of the area studies 
(краеведение) module. This means that there 
is no consensus on their definition or identity 
even between the ‘republics’ themselves. The 
series of scandalous individual initiatives such 
as the creation of the state of ‘Malorossiya’8, 
8 In July 2017 representatives of the so-called Donetsk 
and Luhansk people’s republics, as well as 19 regions 
of Ukraine, announced in Donetsk the creation of 
a state called ‘Malorossiya’; it was declared that Ukraine 
was a failed state, and that a new entity should arise 
in its place. See https://dan-news.info/politics/pred-
staviteli-dnr-lnr-i-regionov-ukrainy-obyavili-v-do-
necke-o-sozdanii-gosudarstva-malorossiya.html
attempts to introduce the name of ‘Donbasites’ 
for the locals9, or to teach a ‘Donetsk regional 
dialect’10 to the inhabitants, just underlines this 
ideological chaos. 
Another example of such absurdity is the cel-
ebration in Donetsk of the anniversary of the 
Pereyaslavska Rada in 1654, which is portrayed 
as ‘the unification of Ukraine and Russia’. 
At the same time, Donbas is seen exclusively as 
a part of Russia and any affiliation it may have 
had to Ukraine – especially during the period of 
Bohdan Khmielnytsky, when the region was al-
most uninhabited – is completely denied. These 
last controversies are only partially mitigated 
in three marginal versions of Ukrainian histo-
ry, in which Ukraine and the Ukrainian people 
are something artificial, an ‘invention’ of the 
Austrians or Poles as ‘revenge’ against Russia. 
However, these versions do not appear in the 
‘official’ rhetoric or in the approved school pro-
grams and textbooks.
Conclusions
The uncertain status of the self-proclaimed re-
publics in the east of Ukraine and the nature 
of their internal politics prevent them from 
creating a balanced and consistent ideology, 
as is clearly shown in the existing school cur-
riculums, in the rhetoric, and in the holidays 
they celebrate. The lack of any agreement to 
deploy a UN peacekeeping force in the Donbas 
between the West and Ukraine on the one hand 
and Russia on the other offers no hope for 
a quick resolution to the conflict. That is why 
this region is likely to remain in a state of drift-
ing armed conflict in the coming years. In this 
situation, the DPR and LPR will certainly con-
tinue to work on the creation of the ‘Donbas 
9 h t tp : / / l ug - in fo .com /comm e nt s /on e / i o - r e k to -
ra-lnau-mikhail-oreshkin-sravnivat-uroven-nashego-vu-
za-i-ego-ukrainskogo-dvoinika-nekorrektno-542
10 https: //dan-news.info/culture-ru/prepodavateli- i -
studenty-vuzov-dnr-nachali-izuchenie-doneckogo-
dialekta-v-planax-sozdanie-slovarya.html
It can may be expected that the uncon-
ventional gas issue will give rise to ten-
sion on the in Ukrainian political scene 
politics more than once, especially when 
the next elections are scheduled. 
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people’ as a kind of community opposing the 
rest of Ukraine, in which populists from the 
western and central parts of the country may 
come to power in 2019.
Russia does not exert a direct influence on the 
identity policy of the ‘republics’ per se, although 
Moscow supports them financially, in particular 
by funding special programs such as the ‘Hu-
manitarian program for reunification of the 
Donbas people’ and projects like the research 
into the ‘Donetsk regional dialect’. Russian tel-
evision also continues to play an essential role 
in the region.
The more difficult the economic situation in 
the ‘republics’ becomes, and the greater the 
fatigue and disappointment of local population 
under such conditions, the more active and 
aggressive the local propaganda will become. 
It is obvious that the longer the conflict con-
tinues, the more difficult it will be for Kyiv to 
reintegrate the population of the breakaway 
territories when it ends.
